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BAR BRIEFS
DIVORCE-FOREIGN DIVORCE-CONCLUSIVENESS OF
NEVADA DIVORCE UNDER FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
After marrying and living together with their respective
spouses for many years in North Carolina, A and B went into
Nevada, residing for a little more than six weeks in an "Auto
Court" near Las Vegas. Each filed suit for divorce in Nevada,
employing the same attorney. In neither suit was defendant personally served in Nevada, nor did defendants appear. Service
was by publication. Both obtained divorce decrees, and the day
the second decree was obtained, A and B married each other in
Nevada. Thereafter they returned to North Carolina and lived
together as man and wife, until indicted. Subsequently they were
tried and convicted of bigamous cohabitation under the North
Carolina Code. The North Carolina Court affirmed the conviction. Held, on certiorari, reversed and remanded. The full faith
and credit clause of the Constitution requires that North Carolina
recognize fully the Nevada decrees, the Nevada domicile not being
in issue. Williams v. State of North Carolina, - U. S. -, 63 Sup.
Ct. 207 (Dec. 21, 1942) (6-2 decision).
Domicil of the plaintiff within the state is indispensable to
confer jurisdiction upon a court to grant a valid divorce decree
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237 (1903); Thelen
v. Thelen, 75 Minn. 433, 78 N. W. 108 (1899); Smith v. Smith,
10 N. D. 219, 86 N. W. 721 (1901); Graham v. Graham, 9 N. D.
88, 81 N. W. 44 (1899); Smith v. Smith, 7 N. D. 404, 75 N. W.
783 (1898); 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 111; 1
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 111. In addition,
statutes usually require continuous residence by the plaintiff for
a specified period, residence in such cases being construed as
synonymous with domicil. Smith v. Smith, 7 N. D. 404, 75 N. W.
783 (1898). Even personal appearance by both parties in court,
when neither is domiciled within the state, does not provide the
bases for a divorce decree entitled to any recognition by compulsion of the full faith and credit clause. Andrews v. Andrews, 188
U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237 (1903); Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175, 21
Sup. Ct. 551 (1901). If the plaintiff is domiciled within the decree-granting state and the court acquires personal jurisdiction
over the other party, the decree is good and must be given full
faith and credit by other states. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108,
19 L. ed. 604 (1870). The present position of the Supreme Court
as just announced by the principal case is to the effect that full
faith and credit must be given a decree of divorce granted by a
state wherein the plaintiff was domiciled, notwithstanding that
the other party was never personally within the jurisdiction of
the court and was served only by publication. Justice Douglas,
writing for the Majority, states expressly that Haddock v. Haddock is overruled. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct.
525 (1906), had been giving difficulty for several decades. It was
authority for the rule that full faith and credit does not have to
be given a decree of divorce granted by a state that is the domicil
of the plaintiff, but not the matrimonial domicil (i. e. place where
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the parties live together as husband and wife), if the court had
no personal jurisdiction over the defendant and if the plaintiff
wrongly abandoned the defendant. In the case, the husband
wrongfully left his wife in New York, the state of matrimonial
domicil, acquired a new domicil in Connecticut, and obtained a
divorce under Connecticut law from a Connecticut court. The
wife never appeared nor was she personally served in Connecticut,
and service was by publication only. New York was upheld in its
refusal to recognize the Connecticut divorce. By New York law
the husband wrongfully left the wife. Connecticut officially undoubtedly knew nothing of this, as there was no one in the Connecticut suit to make that point. However, an earlier rule was
not touched by the Haddock case, and Justice Holmes dissented
on the ground that the factual distinctions did not justify the
different results. The Atherton case had given this earlier rule
to the effect that full faith and credit must be accorded a decree
of divorce granted by the court of a state which is the last matrimonial domicil of the parties, if the plaintiff is domiciled in this
state aforesaid, and notwithstanding that the defendant is an
absent nonresident, not personally within the jurisdiction of the
court. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544
A majority of state courts, from considerations of
(1901).
comity or expediency, had given recognition to divorce decrees
granted where the plaintiff only was domiciled within a state and
the defendant was served only by publication, and where the decree-granting state was not that of last matrimonial domicil of
the parties. Miller v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1193, 206 N. W. 262
(1925); GOODICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2nd ed. 1938) § 128.
The principal case seemingly leaves them no longer any choice;
recognition is mandatory under the Constitution.
The significance of the Williams case upon careful analysis
may not be so great as at first assumed. It would seem definitely
to make of no importance whether the state granting the divorce
is that of last matrimonial domicil or one where the plaintiff has
subsequently acquired a domicil, after wrongfully leaving a
spouse in another state. But has it added much beyond this?
The question of fault or wrong in the marital rift is immaterial
so far as exercise of divorce granting power by a non-matrimonial
domicil state is concerned, the majority opinion tells us. Yet the
old familiar rule that a wife at fault in regard to her marriage
relationship cannot acquire a domicil seprate from that of her
husband's domicil and divorce him in such a state of attempted
separate domicil, is not altered; inasmuch as Justice Douglas carefully skirts around any consideration of domicil. He says that
North Carolina isn't contesting the cases on the ground of failure
of Nevada domicil; that by Nevada statutes and cases, plaintiffs
had a Nevada domicil. Of more interest, is the disinclination to go
into the question of whether the Nevada domicils were in good
faith. The dissent of Justice Reed would treat plaintiffs' Nevada
domicil as sham, not in good faith, and for that reason of failure
of domicil, as well as failure of due process, deny the Nevada decree extra-territorial effect. Only because the doctrines of the
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Haddock case was one of two possible grounds for the North
Carolina conviction of the parties does Justice Douglas find it
necessary to consider that case and determine it not a good
ground, and the case overruled. The practical side of the present
situation, it is submitted, sums up to the following: in the absence
of any questioning of the good faith of the domicil in Nevada,
Nevada can grant a divorce which must be given full faith and
credit in all states, notwithstanding that plaintiff left a spouse
in another state, by the law of which deserting spouse was at fault
and in the wrong is respect to the marital rift. Nevada applies
its own law as to divorce and its own concept of domicil and residence. Defendant, non-resident, and absent, may be served only
by publication, and so actually know nothing of the Nevada proceedings, and consequently never come in to protest either on
merits or question of domicil and jurisdiction. Such a condition
in effect does make the present ultimate divorce law of the United
States that of the most lax or liberal state, the only drawback
being expense and trouble of satisfying the law of that state as
to domicil and residence. If, as one gathers concurring Justice
Frankfurter hopes, this decision spurs on the adoption of a Constitutional Amendment and a national, uniform law of marriage
and divorce, eventually the result may be salutary. No revolutions or sheddings of blood have followed in any single state upon
determining what moral sensibilities shall be legalized in respect
to marriage and divorce laws. It is most conceivable that Congress
could draw up a uniform law upon domestic relations, without provoking more than forensic battles and the customary amount of
legislative sparring behind the lines. There will always be some
who view with pious horror or defy with unholy disregard.
But until a national, uniform law is adopted, the chances are
good that we shall see an effort to neutralize practically the principal decision by a means inferentially left wide open by Justice
Douglas, and openly sponsored by the dissent of Justice Reed.
This line of attack will be by showing that the domicil in the decree-granting state was a sham, not in good faith. The rule yet
remains that a divorce obtained in a state where the plaintiff
had only a sham domicil is not entilted to full faih and credit.
Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175, 21 Sup. Ct. 551 (1901). The forum in
each case applies its own test in determining whether an alleged
domicil is sham, or in good faith; and even although the record
of the court of a sister state recites facts and conclusions as to
domicil and jurisdiction, another court in another state can hear
evidence refuting the record of the first state, and completely
thus impeach the judgment of the sister state, making it of no
extra-territorial validity so far as the impeaching forum is concerned. German Savings & Loan Soc. v. Dormitzer, 192 U. S.
125, 24 Sup. Ct. 221 (1904); 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1935) § 111.2. Theoretically we have long held that a person
has only one domicil at a time. Practically, he may have as many
as differing states choose to give him; each state holding to the
rule of only one domicil at a time, but pronouncing that this one
domicil is within its own borders. As yet, no finding of domicil

BAR BRIEFS
by the court of one state is final and binding upon the courts of
another state. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2nd ed.
1938) § 20. However, if defendant has appeared and contested
the question of domicil of plaintiff, and has had his day in court,
then a finding against defendant is binding and entitled to full
faith and credit. Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 59 Sup. Ct. 3
(1938). It is submitted,. then, that the Williams case makes it no
more legally easy than before for a wife at fault in the marital
rift to acquire a separate domicil for nation-wide divorce purposes, at least so long as the courts of states which did not grant
the divorce choose to treat the alleged domicil in the decreegranting state as a sham.
A LAW STUDENT
School of Law,
University of North Dakota.
TRAFFIC LAW ENFORCEMENT
Thru the kindness and co-operation of Thomas L. Degnan of Grand
Forks, who is the State Chairman of the Junior Bar Conference of the
American Bar Association, we give you a synopsis of the recommendations
of the Traffic Court Committee of the Junior Bar Conference on Traffic
Courts, and their procedure.
TRAFFIC LAWS
1. Traffic laws with inherent defects should be revised and those
which are unenforceable or unnecessary should be repealed.
2. Traffic statutes should be founded upon the "Uniform Vehicle Code"
and the "Model Traffic Ordinances" with only regulations purely local in
nature left to local ordinance. However, an exception should be made
where this would result in ousting local courts from jurisdiction to try traffic violations.
3.

TRAFFIC COURTS
All courts should treat traffic cases apart from their other business.

4. Special courts for traffic cases are necessary when the number of
cases reach 7,500 per year with a violations bureau in operation, and 15,000
cases per year when there is no bureau.
5. The ideal traffic court organization would be on a State basis with
various district courts, and with circuits operating from each district.
6. Physical courtroom conditions should be improved as to facilities,
arrangements, cleanliness, and appearance.
7. The taxing of courts costs as a separate penalty should be eliminated, and the fine assessed in one sum. If costs are included, they should
be in a reasonable amount.

VIOLATIONS BUREAUS
8. Violations bureaus are to be used only when the number of traffic
cases make it impossibel for the court to dispose properly of them.
9. The basis for all violations bureaus should be a signed plea of guilty
and waiver of trial.
10. Schedules of fines charged at the violations bureau are not to be
alterable.
11. The bureau should handle the least hazardous violations and
should deal with moving offenses only when they respond to treatment

